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Highlights
• The rationale for the cooperation and coordination of reactions to supply 
disruptions can be based on political motives or economic motives; even if 
the rationale is political, coordinated reactions require the implementation of 
two economic principles.
• By using economic incentives for as long as possible and by minimising 
losses after economic incentives have been interrupted, countries commit to 
maximise the economic value of gas consumption and that creates common 
ground to support solidarity.
• While the proper implementation of both principles is necessary, the imple-
mentation from before the 2016 sustainable energy security package has 
several shortcomings; some of these issues are addressed in the new package.
• There is, however, room for additional improvements beyond the proposals 
in the package to better use economic incentives for activating demand side 
resources, to make the criteria for interrupting economic incentives firm and 
transparent such as a price cap, to orderly rank resources when economic 
incentives have been interrupted, and to make those on the receiving end of 
solidarity anticipate the end of solidarity as soon as possible.
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1.  Introduction
 e 2016 package on sustainable energy security1 introduces 
mandatory solidarity in the reactive stage of a gas supply dis-
ruption. In other words, Member States are required to coop-
erate and coordinate their reactions at the supranational level, 
to help each other.  is is new, as the reactions to supply dis-
ruptions traditionally had been a matter of national regulation 
with some EU encouragement to voluntarily cooperate on the 
alignment of national reactions, whereas in the past EU reg-
ulation of supply disruptions was primarily oriented towards 
achieving market adequacy and grid adequacy2, which together 
are the basis for preventing gas supply disruptions and which 
are prerequisites for any reaction scheme.
 e politically motivated change from national reactions to 
mandatory regionally coordinated reactions has been triggered 
by the assertion in the 2014 Communication3 on the ENTSOG 
stress test that reactions with international solidarity are to be 
preferred over nationally oriented reactions. However, interna-
tionally coordinated reactions are only economically superior 
to national reactions to the extent that lower valued gas in one 
country is cut before higher valued gas has to be cut in another 
country. 
To ensure that coordinated reactions indeed perform better 
than national reactions, it is necessary to properly implement 
– in addition to both market and grid adequacy prerequisites – 
two economic principles that together maximise the economic 
value of gas consumption.  e  rst economic principle is using 
economic incentives for as long as possible to allocate scarce 
gas supplies (‘economic incentives  rst’).  e second principle 
is minimising the losses of gas rationing a er economic incen-
tives have played their part (‘minimise losses’), e.g. when high 
value gas consumption is curtailed by the competent authority 
while supply to lower valued gas consumption is continued. 
1. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposes-new-rules-
gas-and-heating-and-cooling-strategy 
2. On the market side, regulation includes, for instance, the ACER Gas 
Target Model for functioning markets, EU-wide network codes, RE-
MIT and the supervision of long term gas contracts. On the grid side, it 
includes, for instance, a binding target for physical reverse  ow on the 
entire EU gas grid, the EU Ten Year Network Development Plan and 
the High-Level Groups for the coordination of investment, the TEN-E 
regulation to facilitate the implementation of important gas infrastruc-
ture including the possibility of co- nancing.  e sustainable energy 
security package also introduces many improvements to the regulation 
to prevent disruptions: strategies to be developed for supply diversi ca-
tion, for gas storage and for LNG, in addition to reinvigorated e orts 
to complete the internal market for gas with an updated target model, 
to strengthen supervision of inter-governmental agreements, and to ad-
dress urgent infrastructure bottlenecks.
3. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the short term resilience of the European gas 
system: Preparedness for a possible disruption of supplies from the 
East during the fall and winter of 2014/2015. Brussels, 16.10.2014. 
COM(2014) 654  nal.
 is policy brief then appraises the proposals in the sustainable 
energy security package, addressing two questions: 1/ are both 
principles always necessary and, 2/ are there issues in the cur-
rent implementation of both principles. 
 e second section of this brief presents the arguments as to 
why both principles are essential even if the rationale for coop-
eration is based on political motives, as is the case for man-
datory solidarity in the sustainable energy security package. 
Without both principles (and both prerequisites), the long term 
functioning of the regionally coordinated reaction schemes to 
gas disruptions is at risk because the rationale for cooperation 
would be undermined.
 e third section of this brief illustrates the shortcomings in 
the implementation of both principles from before the new 
package. Because large gas supply disruptions have been few 
and isolated, practical experiences with national reactions to 
disruptions, let alone interacting national reactions, have been 
very limited. For that reason, the presented illustrations are of 
a theoretical nature. Nevertheless, the shortcomings have to be 
addressed and the new package already proposes several reme-
dies for that purpose, of which this brief takes stock, while also 
pointing out shortcomings and improvements not addressed in 
the new package.
2. Necessity of the economic principles
In this section, the rationale for cooperation on reactions to 
disruption in the new package is explored, discussing  rst the 
fundamental political reasons for cooperation, followed by the 
role of economic principles in the political rationale, to con-
clude with the observed experience with cooperation on reac-
tions so far. 
Fundaments of the political rationale for cooperation
 ere are two strong political reasons to make internationally 
coordinated reactions to disruptions mandatory. First, soli-
darity between EU Member States is a fundamental principle 
of the EU Treaty. Second, coordinated reactions are a way to 
speak with one voice towards external actors who are involved 
in a disruption. 
Both reasons presume4 that EU citizens and their representa-
tives act out of sympathy with each other. In the case of gas 
disruptions, citizens who are aware of other citizens without a 
supply of gas and who understand what it means to be in such 
4. Otherwise, there would be no democratic basis for the political deci-
sions, which would not be sustainable in the long term.
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a situation, would be compelled to respond and help out of a 
sense of reciprocity (it could happen to us).5
 e role of economic principles in political rationale
 e economic principles have a subsidiary role to the domi-
nating political rationale. As the fundament of sympathy is 
the mutual understanding that two economic agents have, it is 
important that there is su  cient symmetry of,  rst, the levels 
of market and grid adequacy and, second, the e orts to max-
imise the economic value of sustained gas consumption. For 
instance, if a country is perceived not to invest in a resilient 
infrastructure, another country might believe the  rst country 
is freeriding the second country’s e orts and refuse to bail out 
the  rst country, especially if disruptions repeat. 
 e  rst and best approach to maximise value under scarcity 
is to rely on economic incentives to allocate scarce supplies 
and activate resources for as long as possible, followed by the 
second best option of de ning what consumption is guaran-
teed for di erent consumers when economic incentives have 
been interrupted, e.g. because they are too slow to balance 
demand and supply or because the allocation becomes polit-
ically unacceptable. 
Evidently, these principles can be applied to strictly national 
reactions as well, but it is fair to assume that more resources 
to react with, e.g. gas in storage, domestic production or LNG 
terminals, are available in a larger geographical area and a 
coordinated reaction would at least preserve economic value or 
even increase it compared to a series of uncoordinated national 
reactions. By ranking all resources to react with according to 
their economic cost and then using the lowest cost resources 
regardless of their geographical location, the highest economic 
value is achieved. 
Observations on cooperation so far
Besides the example of the Baltic countries, which have vol-
untarily initiated, but not yet completed the development of a 
coordinated reaction, there are no internationally coordinated 
reactions on a voluntary basis.  is suggests that sympathy 
between Member States has not been strong enough to initiate 
cooperation and that might be explained by shortcomings in 
the two prerequisites (market adequacy and grid adequacy) 
and/or shortcomings in the consistent implementation of the 
economic principles. 
Making solidarity and coordinated reactions mandatory can 
initiate cooperation, but in the long term, it is necessary to 
5. Economic theory also uses the concept of ‘commitment’ to explain the 
actions of economic agents out of a sense of moral duty. Citizens could, 
in theory, wish to send gas to citizens who are out of gas because it is the 
right thing to do.
ensure that the subsidiary economic principles and economic 
prerequisites are met. Otherwise, public support for solidarity 
might diminish. 
 e proposal in the sustainable energy security package to base 
the composition of the geographical regions on several criteria 
that can be linked to market adequacy (e.g. supply patterns, 
market maturity) and grid adequacy (e.g. current and planned 
interconnections), is a step towards ensuring common ground, 
even if geographical proximity, for logical reasons, remains the 
 rst criterion.
3. Implementation of the economic 
principles
In this section, the implementation of both economic princi-
ples from before the sustainable energy security package is dis-
cussed, illustrating shortcomings and discussing the remedial 
measures proposed in the new package as well as remedies that 
go beyond the current proposals.
3.1 Implementation of economic incentives as a  rst 
response
 e principle to use economic incentives for as long as pos-
sible is implemented through, 1/ the de nition of the set of 
resources6 that can be activated by means of economic incen-
tives, and 2/ the criteria for interrupting the use of economic 
incentives when those incentives are no longer able to balance 
gas supply and demand.
 ere are two shortcomings related to de ning the set of 
resources to which economic incentives are applied, and one 
shortcoming related to the criteria for calling the interruption 
of economic incentives.
First shortcoming: national preferences to exclude 
resources from economic incentives
 e accessibility to gas resources depends on national decisions 
to invest in grid adequacy and market adequacy. However, even 
if a country has access to a resource, it does not mean that the 
activation of a resource a er a disruption is based on economic 
incentives. Many countries, for instance, do not consider the 
potential of payments to reduce demand in case of a disruption.
6. Typical resources include using gas from storages, raising domestic pro-
duction, raising pipeline/LNG imports and reducing demand.
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Sustainable energy security package remedy for the  rst 
shortcoming: raising awareness
 e package indirectly addresses the shortcoming 
through its requirement of Member States to do an impact 
assessment for any measure that is not based on economic 
incentives and compare those with measures based on 
economic incentives. 
 e proposed remedy is likely to raise awareness in the 
Member States about economic incentives, and Member 
States could benchmark each other with respect to which 
resources are subject to economic incentives, and which 
are excluded.
Additional consideration: better use of economic incen-
tives to activate demand resources
Notwithstanding that interruptible gas contracts are 
relatively well established for the largest industrial con-
sumers and that gas based electricity generation is fairly 
price responsive, the larger potential of reactions with 
demand-side resources based on economic incentives is 
still largely untapped.  e EU could facilitate and coor-
dinate (national) pilot studies to explore the technical, 
business and regulatory requirements to enable/promote 
large scale demand-side participation in the gas market. It 
could draw from the many experiences with pilot studies 
on activating demand response in electricity markets.
Second shortcoming: inconsistent use of imported 
resources 
Some countries rely on imported resources to react to a disrup-
tion, which is  ne. However, if several countries face a disrup-
tion at the same time and they rely on the same resource, it 
could lead to distortion of the economic incentives.  is could, 
for instance, occur when two countries want to withdraw gas 
from the same storage, which could lead to local market power 
and skyrocketing prices for gas from that source.
Sustainable energy security package remedy for second 
shortcoming: ex ante cooperation
 e package requires that Member States cooperate in pre-
paring their reactions; the possible double use of resources 
would be discovered in advance, allowing the Member 
States to proactively look for additional resources to react 
with, which could dampen price increases.
 ird shortcoming: national preferences for interrup-
tion criteria
Notwithstanding a few exceptions who apply quantitative 
thresholds to call an interruption of economic incentives such 
as the UK or Romania, in most countries, the decision to inter-
rupt economic incentives, which corresponds to calling the 
emergency state, is based on qualitative criteria.7 Such non-
 rm interruption criteria provide some  exibility to respond to 
a disruption, but also make the response contestable. Consider 
the case in which a competent national authority rules that the 
severity of a disruption is such that economic incentives are 
unable to balance demand and scarce supply and therefore it 
restricts the export of gas. Other countries could challenge that 
claim, creating a legal dispute regarding the internal market.  
 e Commission does verify any national decision to interrupt 
economic incentives; however, it can only take non-binding 
actions such as requesting that the Member State restores eco-
nomic incentives.
Sustainable energy security package remedy for third 
shortcoming: ex ante cooperation 
 e practical implementation of the criteria to move 
between the stages of a crisis is still le  to the national level. 
 e package demands mandatory cooperation during the 
development of the coordinated reactions, which allows 
the discovery of inconsistencies, but does not necessarily 
lead to them being resolved.
Additional consideration:  rm criteria for interrupting 
economic incentives
To make the decision to interrupt economic incentives 
transparent, it is necessary to de ne  rm interruption 
criteria. A price cap is one implementation in which 
economic incentives are interrupted as soon as the price 
breaks the price cap level.  e most challenging part of 
using price caps is then de ning the cap level, which 
should be su  ciently high, while for instance also consid-
ering a ordability8 of consumption. An alternative could 
be to use a volume cap as the trigger to interrupt eco-
nomic incentives; that cap could, for instance, be linked to 
the necessary activation of supply reserves to meet supply 
obligations.
7. P. Zeniewski, R. Bolado-Lavin, 2012. A review of national gas emer-
gency plans in the European Union. Energy Policy 49 (2012) 652-662. 
8. Allocating scarce gas based on economic incentives could lead to 
excluding budget constrained consumers. While economically e  cient, 
such an allocation might be socially unacceptable.
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3.2 Implementation of a strategy to minimise losses
As soon as economic incentives are interrupted, other ways of 
allocating the scarce gas supplies have to be applied.  is prin-
ciple is implemented through the de nition of how much con-
sumption is guaranteed to di erent customer groups.
 ere is one shortcoming related to prioritising customer 
groups and one shortcoming related to the level of guaranteed 
consumption for priority consumers; two additional sugges-
tions beyond the sustainable energy security package conclude 
this section.
First shortcoming: national preferences concerning 
priority consumption
In the event of a disruption, protected consumers are maxi-
mally supplied with gas. Depending on national preferences, 
the set of consumers whose consumption is protected can vary 
signi cantly, respecting a minimum standard (all households 
connected to the distribution grid) and a maximum standard 
(households plus small and medium sized enterprises con-
nected to the distribution grid, essential social services, and 
district heating that serves households). A country that de nes 
a smaller set of protected consumers could likely rely on eco-
nomic incentives for a longer period, whereas a country with 
a large set of protected consumers would depend on the prin-
ciple of solidarity far sooner. 
Furthermore, some countries expanded the scope of the pro-
tected consumers even further, claiming that it is technically 
impossible to di erentiate consumers connected to the same 
local grid.
Sustainable energy security package remedy for  rst 
shortcoming: stricter supervision
 e package still leaves it to the national level to de ne 
protected consumers, but with stricter supervision on the 
minimum and maximum standards. Furthermore, the 
requirement to cooperate on the development of the reac-
tion scheme, would allow mutual benchmarking of the 
respective sets of consumers by the Member States. 
Additionally, the package de nes priority consumers, who 
are a strict subset of the protected consumers composed of 
households, essential social services and district heating. 
In case there is insu  cient gas to supply all priority con-
sumers in a Member State, mandatory solidarity requires 
that all other Member States send excess gas to help the 
Member State that has declared a state of emergency.  is 
de nition then limits the volume of solidarity, and it also 
puts an upper limit on the duration of solidarity. 
Second shortcoming: national preferences concerning 
guaranteed consumption
Member States have implemented minimum reserve require-
ments in order to ensure the sustained supply of gas to pro-
tected consumers for at least thirty days. Some Member States 
have gone beyond the minimum standard, which is  ne from 
a national viewpoint, but complicates international coopera-
tion. Consider the case where Member State A calls for help 
to supply its protected consumers, but Member State B refuses 
to contribute because B’s reserves position would deteriorate 
below its nationally required level. To deal with that situation, 
Member States must temporarily lower their national supply 
reserves to the EU minimum in case a state of emergency has 
been called in any of the Member States to free up gas. 
Sustainable energy security package remedy for the 
second shortcoming: stricter supervision
 e package does not change the minimum reserves 
requirement, but introduces stricter supervision regarding 
the impact of higher national reserves requirements on 
other countries and regarding the mechanism to lower 
the reserves to the EU minimum in case of a disruption. 
 e e ect of stricter supervision is di  cult to anticipate 
considering that these reserve mechanisms have not been 
tested in practice. 
Additional consideration 1: prioritising resources 
without economic incentives
Notwithstanding the remedies concerning priority consump-
tion and reserves proposed in the package, internationally 
coordinated reactions would bene t from a common method-
ology to prioritise resources in the absence of economic incen-
tives.  at ranking would facilitate the orderly curtailment of 
non-protected consumers and, if inevitably necessary, pro-
tected consumers. 
Additional consideration 2: anticipating the end of 
solidarity
 e package de nes that solidarity has to continue as long as 
supply to priority consumers is at risk in a Member State which 
is a very open-ended arrangement for Member States at the 
sending end of solidarity. Complementary rules about the res-
toration of national resources and the restoration of economic 
incentives could be conceived to make Member States on the 
receiving end of solidarity act responsibly in order to end sol-
idarity as soon as possible. Inspiration for this can be taken 
from the burden sharing arrangement for frequency control 
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in electricity: there is solidarity in the primary response to a 
problem, but the next step is that the national level takes over 
with national resources.  is makes Member States anticipate 
the end of solidarity by taking appropriate action at the national 
level.
4. Key  ndings
By making the international coordination of reactions to dis-
ruptions mandatory, the EU endeavours to reduce the overall 
impact of disruptions. Even though the rationale in the sustain-
able energy security package to shi  from national reactions to 
coordinated reactions is mainly political, section two of this 
brief has demonstrated the necessity to properly implement 
two economic principles, which are to use economic incentives 
for as long as possible and, a er that, minimise the losses of 
gas consumption which is not based on economic incentives. 
Without proper implementation of both principles, the long 
term sustainability of politically driven solidarity is question-
able as the common ground of maximising the economic value 
of gas consumption would erode.
 erefore, the necessity to properly implement both principles 
creates a problem because the current implementation of both 
principles from before the 2016 package has several shortcom-
ings.  e package, however, addresses three shortcomings with 
respect to using economic incentives and two more shortcom-
ings regarding minimising losses a er economic incentives are 
interrupted by having stricter control on the implementation 
of minimum standards and a clear subset of customers that 
receive priority in the allocation of scarce supplies in a region. 
Nevertheless, there are a few additional improvements to con-
sider such as making better use of demand-side resources 
based on economic incentives to react to disruptions, similar 
to the way demand response is being developed to deal with the 
challenges of the electricity system, making use of  rm criteria 
like a price cap level to interrupt economic incentives, applying 
a common method to prioritise resources to react when eco-
nomic incentives are interrupted, and  nally, implementing 
rules to make countries on the receiving end of solidarity antic-
ipate the end of solidarity as soon as possible.  
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